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The international financial 
crisis: its nature and
the economic policy challenges
José Luis Machinea
This article discusses the origins of the international financial crisis, 
emphasizing the instability of the financial system as a leading cause. 
Although monetary policy in the early part of this decade may have helped 
to inflate the property bubble, it is far from having been the decisive factor. 
This article also argues that the function of controlling excessive asset 
price rises is one for regulatory policy rather than interest rates. What is 
proposed, accordingly, is the creation of institutional arrangements that 
facilitate the implementation of countercyclical financial policies during 
periods of strong economic growth. After considering the characteristics 
that economic policies in developed countries should adopt, the article then 
analyses the effects of the international crisis on the current accounts of 
the region’s countries and the difficulty of applying countercyclical policies 
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As this article was being written, the world was still 
caught up in one of the worst economic crises of the 
past century. The epicentre was the financial collapse 
in the United States, but the shockwaves had spread to 
financial systems in parts of Europe. While the history 
of financial crises dates back several centuries (and the 
world has experienced some 300 of them, of differing 
sizes and characteristics, in the last 200 years), none 
has been as profound and far-reaching as the present 
one, with the sole exception of the crisis that began 
in the early 1930s.1 Furthermore, economic policy 
responses being equal, this crisis is very likely to be far 
graver than that one. There are three factors suggesting 
this: the sheer size of the financial market, broadly 
defined, as it is several times the size of developed 
countries’ combined output (see table 1), the profound 
interconnectedness of financial institutions around the 
world, and the historically unprecedented opacity of 
the financial system.
These factors at least partially explain how 
an initial loss estimated at between US$ 300 
billion and US$ 400 billion on the United States 
subprime mortgage market can have led to a crisis 
of  this magnitude. As of  early 2008, losses on assets 
originating in lending by the United States financial 
system appeared to be in excess of  US$ 2.2 trillion, 
  The author wishes to express his appreciation to the following 
for their comments: Álvaro Díaz, J.M Fanelli, P. Gerchunoff, 
D. Heymann, D. Sotelsek and an anonymous reader; thanks are 
also due to Andrés F. Herrera for his invaluable assistance.
1 Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) record over 300 financial crises from 
1800 to the present day. The frequency of crises has increased in 
recent decades (Bordo and Eichengreen, 2001); Laeven and Valencia 
(2008) list 125 crises between 1970 and 2007.
although the final figure will depend on the scale and 
duration of  the recession.
Meanwhile, the crisis has generated losses on asset 
values, particularly share and house prices, equivalent 
to some 25% of global wealth. Figure 1 shows the 
scale of  losses on the New York stock market in 
comparison with other crises of the last 80 years. As 
of late December, the stock markets of the world’s 
leading economies had lost some 40% to 45% of their 
value, while in China the figure was over 60%. This 
drop in wealth is, along with uncertainty, one of the 
main factors behind the worsening recession.
The current financial crisis raises a variety of issues 
encompassing everything from its origins, its peculiarities 
and the factors compounding it to the question of what 
can be done to prevent it from worsening and how 
similar crises can be avoided in future. Some of these 
issues are discussed in this article which, following this 
introduction, devotes a second section to analysing the 
concurrent and determining factors in financial crises, 
particularly the present one. As there is no consensus 
about what causes crises, we thought it helpful to present 
(third section) some alternative explanations, many of 
which are complementary. The fourth section examines 
some factors that have exacerbated the crisis and that 
are familiar from the long-standing debate about moral 
hazard and systemic risk. The fifth section considers 
what could be done in the way of  countercyclical 
policies to reduce the scale and duration of the current 
international recession, with particular emphasis on 
bank capitalization and fiscal policy. The sixth section 
offers a very stylized account of the effects of the 
crisis on Latin America, the difficulty of implementing 
countercyclical policies and the importance of having a 
global lender of last resort. The closing section contains 
some final reflections.
“A sound banker, alas, is not one who foresees danger and avoids it, but one who, when he is ruined,
is ruined in a conventional way along with his fellows, so that no one can really blame him.”
John M. Keynes (1931)
“Most astonishingly, these now-doubtful techniques had previously been hailed as the cornerstones of 
modern risk management. Moreover, the turbulence proved greatest in countries whose supervision 
of credit risk had been thought to be the best in the world. Indeed, the regulatory standards and 
protocols of these countries were in the process of being emulated worldwide.” 
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TABLE 1
Size of the capital market: selected indicators, 2007
(Billions of dollars, except where other units are specified)
 gdp Stock market  Debt securities Bank  Bonds, shares Bonds, shares and
  capitalization  assets and bank assets bank assets (% of  gdp)
 
Public Private Total
World 54.5 65.1 28.6 51.2 79.8 84.8 229.7 421.1
European Union 15.7 14.7 8.8 19.4 28.2 43.1 86.1 548.8
  Euro area 12.2 10.0 7.6 15.4 23.0 30.1 63.5 520.1
North America 15.2 22.1 7.4 24.0 31.5 13.8 67.4 441.8
  Canada 1.4 2.2 0.8 0.8 1.6 2.6 6.4 442.5
  United States 13.8 19.9 6.6 23.3 29.2 11.2 61.0 441.8
Japan 4.4 4.7 7.1 2.1 9.2 7.8 21.7 495.7
Source: International Monetary Fund (imf), Global Financial Stability Report. Financial Stress and Deleveraging. Macro-financial 
Implications and Policy, Washington, D.C., 2008.
FIGURE 1
United States share prices during the financial crises of the last 80 years
(Percentage drop in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index, adjusted for inflation)
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  Financial Times, Standard & Poor’s and Shiller, R.J. (2000), Irrational Exuberance, 
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1. Concurrent factors
Two elements have characterized all financial crises: 
the existence of  a system, which means there is a 
network through which problems interconnect and 
affect many actors, and opacity of  information, 
which means that different actors have different 
levels of  information about the quality of financial 
intermediaries’ assets and the characteristics of their 
liabilities (asymmetrical information).
Both elements have been particularly important 
in the present crisis. There has never been a financial 
system more complex and interconnected than 
the one developed during this phase of  financial 
globalization. One manifestation of  this is that in 
mid-2008 the derivatives market was worth US$ 500 
trillion, or nine times global output.2 Furthermore, 
there is no precedent for the opacity characterizing the 
financial system in recent years. It became more and 
more difficult to understand the different “vehicles” 
and derivatives; the vocabulary used became more 
and more impenetrable as it turned into a specialist 
jargon. Operations became less and less transparent 
as a result.3
With regard to the first point, the outstanding 
example was the bailout of the world’s leading insurance 
company, American International Group (aig), in 
October and November 2008. This forestalled solvency 
problems at a number of financial institutions whose 
loans were guaranteed by aig via credit default swaps. 
Considering the number of operations insured and the 
amounts involved (about US$ 450 billion, including 
55,000 subprime mortgages) and the amount of 
assistance (US$ 150 billion to December 2008), it can 
hardly be doubted that aig was insolvent.
The reason for providing an insolvent institution 
with this assistance was to ward off  a systemic crisis, 
since the collapse of aig could have dragged down a 
number of financial institutions and created a panic. 
2 US$ 55 billion of this was accounted for by credit default swaps.
3 See Mizen (2008) for a detailed description and analysis of the 
different instruments and vehicles.
Practices like these undoubtedly increase moral hazard, 
an issue we shall return to later.
Regarding the second point, it is no surprise 
that information asymmetries should have been a 
determining factor in the sharp contraction of lending 
during the early stages of  the crisis, both between 
financial institutions and in the commercial paper 
market. The first large increase in the cost of interbank 
credit came in mid-August, following months of 
house price falls in the United States and a fortnight 
in which a number of hedge funds went bankrupt; 
this happened despite huge funding injections by 
central banks (see figure 2). Nobody could be better 
placed than financial institutions to understand the 
characteristics of widely used instruments, realize that 
they were under growing strain and at the same time 
be aware of how hard it was to value the portfolios 
of other institutions.
In just a few weeks, information asymmetries 
gave way to total uncertainty: when events occur that 
radically alter a situation and destroy what agents 
thought they knew, the problem is not just that some 
are informed and others uninformed, but that nobody 
has the information they need.4
2. The determining factors in the crisis: boom, 
euphoria and procyclical lending
While it is safe to say that interconnectedness, 
information asymmetry and, finally, a large dose of 
uncertainty are all necessary for financial crises to 
come about, we need to ask why they are recurrent. 
There is no simple answer, so it is hardly surprising 
that interpretations differ.
One important distinction between the different 
explanations is the role each assigns to the market and 
public policies. For some, financial crises are the result 
of errors connected with State intervention, whether 
at the microeconomic or the macroeconomic level; 
4 Bagehot wrote: “In England, after a great calamity, everybody 
is suspicious of everybody; as soon as that calamity is forgotten, 
everybody again confides in everybody” (Bagehot, 1920, pp. 124 
and 125).
II
Concurrent and determining factors
in financial crises
37
ThE InTERnATIonAL fInAnCIAL CRIsIs: ITs nATuRE And ThE EConomIC PoLICy ChALLEngEs  •  José LuIs mAChInEA
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 7  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 9
for others, they follow naturally from the workings 
of  the financial system. While the former believe 
that the market ought to play a leading role, both 
in crisis prevention and in the search for solutions, 
the latter insist on the need to improve (and in some 
cases completely alter) the nature of regulations in 
order to prevent, or at least restrain, the procyclical 
behaviour of  the system. In these cases a number 
of concurrent factors tend to be involved, and the 
present crisis is no exception. However, we believe 
that certain elements predominate, and it is these that 
will now be discussed.
(a) Boom, euphoria and procyclical lending
One well-known explanation for cycles of 
economic boom and bust concerns the behaviour of the 
financial system and is associated with the thinking of 
Minsky and Kindleberger.5 The argument is that as the 
expansionary phase of the cycle proceeds, financed by 
burgeoning credit, there is growing confidence that the 
boom will continue and this increases the demand for 
5 See Minsky (1972, 1975 and 1986) and Kindleberger and Aliber 
(2005). Bordo (2008) reminds us that this explanation is rooted in 
the tradition of nineteenth-century monetary economics and was 
further developed by Irving Fisher (1933).
and supply of credit. Euphoria and the expansion of 
financing generate a bubble in some or all asset prices, 
creating a feeling that buying these assets on credit is 
a very profitable activity. In an increasing number of 
cases as the boom continues, credits can actually be 
paid down only if prices keep rising. As Minsky put it, 
“a regime in which capital gains are being earned and 
are expected is a favorable environment for engaging 
in speculative and Ponzi finance”.6
Credit growth, which often occurs in a context of 
loose monetary policy, is boosted during the expansion 
phase by increased leverage in the financial system, 
i.e., by a rising ratio between assets and equity.7 
Historically, this has been the result of innovations that 
demand less capital, including the emergence of new 
intermediaries, which has reduced the participation 
of traditional deposit banks in the financial sector. 
The extreme case is the United States, where financial 
6 Minsky (1986, p. 210). Financing is described as speculative 
when revenues are sufficient to pay off  only the interest and not 
the capital; Ponzi financing is when revenues are not sufficient to 
pay capital or interest. In both cases, capital gains are essential 
to “survival”.
7 This increased leverage observed by Minsky in the expansionary 
phase of the cycle has been corroborated by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008).
FIGURE 2
Three-month interest rate spread: libor, Treasury bills
and financial commercial paper, 2007-2008
(Basis points)
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  Federal Reserve data.
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assets held by traditional deposit banks account for 
less than 25% of all financial institutions’ assets (see 
figure 3).8
Higher leverage weakens the financial system, 
as capital is left more and more exposed to small 
asset losses. Since changes in leverage are procyclical, 
it peaks just when asset prices are starting to fall. 
The effects of price falls, and borrowers’ diminished 
ability to pay in consequence, are thus amplified at 
this stage; in this way, the impact on system solvency 
is greatly heightened.
Solvency problems are intensified by another 
characteristic of the expansionary period. Considering 
that short-term interest rates are usually lower than 
8 Although the size attained by other financial institutions is 
unprecedented, their existence and the importance of their role are 
not. A hundred years ago, the difficulties of trust funds and stock 
market agents were a crucial part of the explanation for the most 
critical developments in the 1907 financial crisis and its favourable 
resolution (Bruner and Carr, 2007).
long-term rates, financial institutions usually finance 
the optimism of the boom by increasing their short-
term liabilities. Too large a mismatch makes them more 
vulnerable to changes in market sentiment, as investors 
tend to reduce their financing once they start to observe 
difficulties with asset quality. The growing shortage 
of  liquidity affects system solvency as institutions 
have to liquidate assets at “fire sale” prices to meet 
their obligations. The scale of the impact on solvency 
depends on a variety of factors, including the size of 
the bubble and the existence or otherwise of a lender 
of last resort which can resolve liquidity issues and 
prevent asset prices from falling too far.
In Minsky’s view, instability is a characteristic 
of  modern financial capitalism and arises because 
expectations are based on the past, leading to speculative 
and Ponzi behaviour. Why, then, do boom periods not 
always end in crises, as the logic of the model would 
appear to require? There are a number of answers, 
ranging from the size of the bubble to the triggers 
FIGURE 3
Size and distribution of financial assets
(Multiples of output)
Source: International Monetary Fund (imf), Global Financial Stability Report. Financial Stress and Deleveraging. Macro-financial 
Implications and Policy, Washington, D.C., 2008.
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for crises, but one particularly important factor is the 
existence in recessions of countercyclical policies that 
are manifested in higher fiscal deficits (partly because 
of automatic stabilizers) and financing for the financial 
system, whose role usually goes beyond that of lender of 
last resort. These are the policies that prevent recessions 
getting out of hand and situations of panic arising. 
Minsky warns that this capacity of countercyclical 
policies would be imperilled if  the tendency towards 
excessive financial system liberalization and growing 
participation by other financial intermediaries were 
to continue.9
This view, which is predicated on the formation 
of  expectations based on the recent past, has few 
points of contact with a view that assumes rational 
expectations; and indeed, if  the latter were at work, it 
would be hard to imagine the behaviour of economic 
agents switching as rapidly as it does in crises, 
particularly when this change in expectations is not 
due to any significant shift in the behaviour expected 
from the public sector.
9 See Minsky (1986, chapters 2, 3 and 4) and Papadimitriou and 
Wray’s excellent introduction to the 2008 edition of Minsky.
(b) The 2007-2008 crisis
The theory analysed in the previous section 
provides a fairly good explanation for the behaviour 
of the financial market in recent years, and particularly 
the sharp rise in house prices in the United States 
and a number of European countries (see figure 4). 
Falling property prices were the trigger for the crisis, 
as they exposed the poor quality of subprime lending, 
which was running at US$ 600 billion a year in the 
United States in 2006 and represented 20% of  all 
mortgage lending in the country. As prices dropped, 
this began to affect the “non-subprime” segment of 
the mortgage market.
To complicate the situation, the euphoria that 
usually goes with booms was compounded by the risk 
rating models used. These had two shortcomings. One 
was that in a number of countries, particularly the 
United States, they were based on information from 
the last five years, which is too short a time as it may 
reflect just one phase of the cycle; the other was the 
assumption in these models that actions undertaken 
on the basis of them would not, as in physics, influence 
the variables they were trying to predict. In this way, 
“herd” movements are accentuated and it is not possible 
to distinguish between one-off changes and systemic 
FIGURE 4
Selected countries: house prices, 2000-2008
(Quarterly data: 2000-I = 100)
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  data from the Spanish Ministry of  Housing, Bank of  England, Standard and Poor’s, 
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shifts. In other words, crises cannot be explain by 
risk models that assume the world is stationary: at 
times of crisis, the parameters defined by stochastic 
processes are not stable, and therefore models based 
on these processes cannot be used to calculate risks 
(Fanelli, 2008 and Heymann, 2007).10
Supervision was obviously deficient, not only 
because market participants were not required to 
apply models based on more reasonable assumptions, 
but also because they were allowed to use different 
ploys to take excessive risks and increase leverage.11 
The inadequacy of supervision seems to have been 
due to a number of factors, ranging from low pay 
and capacity constraints at regulators to efforts to 
give local financial institutions an edge in the global 
marketplace. The most important factor, however, 
was an approach that had the effect of  increasing 
self-regulation by placing the main onus on financial 
institutions themselves, which in this case chose the 
models that best served their growth strategies.
In mid-2007, when falling house prices began to 
affect the asset base of financial intermediaries and 
unsettle the market, the other factor mentioned above 
came to the fore: the volatility of bank financing as 
the role of deposits was taken over by placements 
in the capital markets and, much more seriously, by 
short-term commercial paper.12 Deposits as a share 
of bank liabilities have been diminishing for several 
decades, from 70% in 1980 to just 40% in 2008 (imf, 
2008b).
Raising finance in the money markets and capital 
markets is a trend of recent years that is accounted for 
by the convenience of borrowing large amounts without 
having to incur administrative costs (for branches, 
salaries and advertising, for example). When this trend 
was supplemented by the aforementioned mortgage 
securitization, the picture was complete: the “deposit 
problem” was circumvented, leverage was enhanced and 
responsibility for lending quality was avoided.13
10 See Sotelsek and Pavón (2008) for a description and evaluation 
of the use of risk models.
11 Special investment vehicles (sivs) were the most notorious 
instance of this.
12 A paradigmatic instance of this trend was Northern Rock, a 
bank that was nationalized in September 2007. See Milne and 
Wood (2008).
13 In operations involving sivs, banks generally undertook to supply 
liquidity or take back the loan in the event of solvency problems, 
so that those initiating the operation were left with a liability that 
would later affect them. Some investments of this type, furthermore, 
ended in the purchase of the bonds originally sold by the bank 
owning them (Mizen, 2008).
A final comment is needed on the distortion of 
lending incentives caused by asset securitization. The 
switch from bank to market as the central element in 
risk diversification has clear advantages in terms of 
liquidity and also allows risk to be diversified outside 
of a particular geographical area, including the borders 
of a given country. This assumes that information is 
transparent enough for investors to be aware of the 
risks of the “package” they are buying, a condition 
that was far from being met. Furthermore, replacing 
banks with markets raises some questions, since if  all 
these were “pre-packaged” products, what would be 
the advantage in knowing the client, which was one 
of the main factors behind the rise of banks? Again, 
if  knowing the client does not affect the profitability 
of a financial institution, where is the incentive for 
good lending?
The feeling that something was amiss with the 
assets of  certain financial institutions, particularly 
those backed by low-quality mortgages, arose in full 
force between May and August 2007, when a number 
of  hedge funds were faced with major losses and 
rating agencies reduced the ratings of bonds backed 
by mortgages of different qualities. The uncertainty 
was manifested in the market for short-term asset-
backed commercial paper, which fell by half  in just 
a few months (see figure 5). The consequence was a 
sharp reduction in the liquidity of all the banks that 
had turned to that market, irrespective of individual 
portfolio quality. Just as the solvency problems of 
certain financial institutions affected the liquidity 
of  the system, initially because of  information 
asymmetry and then increasingly because of  the 
general uncertainty, the lack of  liquidity fed back 
into these solvency problems.
To sum up, excessive leverage, the rise in short-
term assets and the growing importance of under-
regulated financial institutions became a dangerous 
mix that was hard to handle.
Lastly, a word about the remuneration of senior 
bank management, particularly in the developed world.14 
Over recent years, this remuneration has been linked 
to short-term profits and, in many cases, the number 
of operations completed. The different “vehicles” and 
increasing leverage contributed to higher profits in the 
short term, and thus to higher pay, irrespective of the 
medium- and long-term repercussions. Furthermore, 
the revenues of  the rating agencies depended on 
14 Forty years ago, Galbraith (1967) warned of the growing importance 
of managers, whose goals were different from shareholders’.
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intermediaries applying for assessment so that they 
could place their instruments in the market. They were 
thus both judge and party to the case. Considering the 
outcome, it seems they were more party than judge.
Executive pay and the role of the rating agencies 
contributed enormously to a model based on excessive 
risk-taking. Although they cannot be said to have 
caused the bubble and financial crisis, they undoubtedly 
propelled it to unknown heights.
As is usually the case, there is no one factor 
that explains the current financial crisis. Who could 
maintain that the policy of holding down interest rates 
for too long between 2001 and 2004 did not affect 
the subsequent situation? Before reviewing this and 
other arguments about the responsibility of economic 
policies for the crisis, some brief  remarks should be 
made about the lack of incentives for implementing 
countercyclical economic policies during the boom.
(c) The economics of the “never-ending” boom
In an economic boom, procyclical lending, 
above-trend output growth and asset-market bubbles, 
particularly for property prices, are “good news”. The 
process is therefore hard to criticize. Not only are the 
banks happy, but so too are businesses that see demand 
growing and can borrow more cheaply, not to mention 
people who are newly able to afford a first or second 
home and of course the owners of assets, who look on 
with pleasure as their wealth steadily expands. In this 
environment, the government can hardly feel anything 
but euphoric: the economic situation means that a 
majority of the population approve of the way it is 
running the country, and it can therefore win elections. 
In these circumstances, who would have the heart to 
spoil the party?
There will probably be analysts who cavil, but 
there will be many others writing clever articles to show 
that the above-trend growth in economic activity is 
because technological change has raised productivity 
on a more or less permanent basis; that property prices 
are still low considering changes in demand now that 
families aspire to own two homes; or, as has repeatedly 
been argued in several developing countries, that 
properties are still much cheaper than in… Paris or 
Rome! Furthermore, there will be those who justify 
large current-account deficits, either because they are 
“the result” of  strong investment demand (even if  
this investment is going into non-tradable goods) or 
FIGURE 5
Asset-backed commercial paper and unsecured financial
and non-financial commercial paper
(Billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted monthly data)
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Unsecured financial commercial paper (left axis)
Unsecured non-financial commercial paper (right axis)
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because they are due to higher saving in the rest of the 
world, which someone “has” to absorb to maintain 
the global balance.
In short, economic policy during boom periods 
is highly conducive to excess. It is no coincidence 
that the clamour for countercyclical policies is heard 
loudly at times of  recession but very rarely in the 
expansionary phases of the cycle. This is why there 
are reasons to doubt the ability of the authorities to 
regulate cycles.15 The most advisable course would 
seem to be to reduce their room for manoeuvre by 
introducing some countercyclical rules. Although 
such measures will certainly be difficult to impose, 
now is the time to do it.
III
An alternative explanation: monetary and 
financial policy errors
There are two lines of  argument that emphasize 
economic policy errors as explanatory factors in 
financial crises. The first stresses the conduct of 
monetary policy; the second has microeconomic 
foundations and centres on the financial system safety 
net, be it implicit or explicit, which reduces the cost 
of the crisis for the different actors involved (banks 
and investors).
1. Monetary policy
According to this viewpoint, the current crisis is 
due to an overly expansionary monetary policy run 
by the Federal Reserve from late 2001 to December 
2004, manifested in Federal Funds rates of less than 
2%. Although the European Union and the United 
Kingdom applied a similar policy, rates were cut by 
less and the period of low rates was less prolonged 
(see figure 6).
From a more structural point of  view, it may be 
argued that the low interest-rate policy was driven by an 
excess of “lendable” funds in the international market, 
produced by: (i) the Chinese policy of  maximizing 
exports and building up international reserves,
(ii) the policy of building up reserves for self-insurance 
purposes in Brazil, China, the Russian Federation, the 
Republic of Korea and various developing countries and 
(iii) the policy in oil-exporting countries of accumulating 
resources in sovereign funds. This increase in saving 
in the “rest of the world”, it is argued, offset the low 
saving rate in the United States and accounted for 
the current-account deficit in that country, which was 
thus surprisingly able to combine lower saving with 
lower interest rates (Roubini, 2005 and Eichengreen, 
2005). Although this interpretation holds true where 
the abundance of “lendable” funds in international 
markets is concerned, it needs to be qualified by the 
observation that, even leaving the United States out 
of the equation, there was no increase in the global 
saving rate, as the rise in the countries mentioned 
was offset by lower saving in the rest of the world, 
particularly Japan and Europe. Furthermore, what 
has been seen in recent years in the rest of Asia, with 
the exception of China, is that “excess saving” has 
basically been due to lower investment.16
Whether they were due to structural causes, 
monetary policy or both, low interest rates were 
conducive to excessive lending growth. However, 
the emphasis in this argument needs to be weighed 
carefully. In the first place, as figure 6 shows, central 
bank interest rates in Europe and the United Kingdom 
were reduced by less than the Federal Reserve rate, 
yet there was also a house price bubble in a number 
of  European countries. Furthermore, while there 
were fewer subprime mortgages in Europe than in 
the United States, this could have been due to more 
appropriate regulation or, probably, to the greater 
depth of the mortgage market in the United States 
resulting in “prime” mortgage lending opportunities 
running out earlier than in other countries.
15 See, for example, Gerchunoff (2008, p. 1), who has argued that 
“examining these failures can provide lessons for the future, but 
crises are inevitable in a capitalist world sustained by ‘animal 
spirits’ and in a democratic world sustained by the hope of social 
progress”.
16 See Eichengreen (2005).
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Secondly, the current crisis cannot be attributed 
to a constriction of the money supply as discussed 
by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) in relation to the 
1929-1932 period. While there was a marked reduction 
in the bank multiplier this time around, as then, the 
increase in the monetary base more than made up 
for it.17
Lastly, it needs to be asked whether holding down 
short-term interest rates over a fairly long period may 
have caused the house price bubble and subsequent 
crisis. It must certainly have had an effect, particularly 
as it may have created expectations that monetary policy 
would not “permit” a recession and that, consequently, 
the prices of  certain assets would carry on rising. 
However, medium- and long-term interest rates fell by 
considerably less (see figure 7), making it difficult to 
justify the rationality of a financial institution deciding 
to grant a 30-year mortgage because the short-term 
interest rate was very low. It may have provided a way 
of offering three years of low introductory mortgage 
rates to tempt buyers with little financial knowledge, 
but it cannot be supposed that financial institutions 
extrapolated this situation to the medium and long 
term. Or did someone think that low interest rates 
were not among the instruments of countercyclical 
policy and therefore would not rise in the expansionary 
phase of the cycle? Again, why did credit continue to 
expand in 2005 and much of 2006, at a time when 
the Federal Reserve was rapidly raising interest rates, 
sending a clear signal that the period of low rates was 
over? The answer lies not so much in monetary policy 
as in the fact that the incentive to increase lending 
was not the long-term profitability of the financial 
institution but the year-end bonus or payment per 
operation concluded.
To sum up, it is possible that keeping interest rates 
low over a long period of time may have influenced 
the behaviour of  the different actors, but this can 
hardly be claimed as the underlying cause of  the 
housing market bubble in the United States and several 
European countries. The economic policy mistake of 
this period was certainly the failure to come to grips 
with the “irrational exuberance” of the markets, but 
it is not clear that this ought to have been a job for 
monetary policy. If  interest rates are already called 
17 In the 1930s, the reduction in the multiplier was due to the increase 
in demand for cash over bank deposits (Bernanke, 2000), while in 
the current crisis it was a consequence of the extraordinary rise in 
bank reserves. In the United States, reserves represented 5.4% of 
the cash held by the public in July 2008, but by November 2008 
that figure had risen to 79.3%.
FIGURE 6
interest rates on open market operations by the Federal reserve,
the European Central Bank and the Bank of England, 2000-2008
(Percentages)
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upon to control inflation and, at least in the United 
States, regulate the level of economic activity, it seems 
excessive to burden them with an additional task like 
that of bringing an asset price bubble under control. 
The reasonable thing would have been to use some 
other instrument, the most obvious choice being 
measures to regulate the system, particularly higher 
capital requirements during the boom.
2. The safety net
A second explanation pointing to faulty public policies 
is the one traditionally maintained by the International 
Monetary Fund (imf) and World Bank. The central 
idea is that the “excessive” presence of public safety 
nets prevents the discipline of  the market from 
operating and thus encourages excessive risk-taking. 
In relation to the present crisis, this view is put forward 
in an article by three World Bank analysts (Caprio, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane, 2008) who argue that 
the problems of the crisis have included inadequate 
regulation and oversight that failed to keep pace with 
financial innovation. In the tradition of World Bank 
documents, however, the emphasis is placed on the 
existence of explicit or implicit subsidies provided via 
the different countries’ safety nets.
The argument is, then, that crises derive from 
an incentive structure which encourages the idea that 
the authorities will have to bail out shareholders and 
investors in financial institutions if they get into trouble. 
In other words, excessive risks are taken during booms 
because actors do not believe the market will ever 
punish them, given the “providential” presence of the 
public sector. This is what is known as moral hazard.18 
One example of it, according to the authors, was the 
rescue of Bear Stearns during the latest crisis, when 
the problems were those of insolvency; according to 
FIGURE 7
United States: interest rate on Federal reserve open
market operations and yield on Treasury securities
(Percentages)
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18 In a world of rational expectations and Ricardian equivalence, 
if  a public-sector bailout is expected then the different economic 
agents ought to reduce their outlays by an amount similar to the 
cost of the State intervention, i.e., to the increase in debt and thus 
in future taxes. In other words, moral hazard will create an incentive 
for greater risk-taking, but at the same time will lead to a reduction 
in demand, two effects that could ultimately offset each other, at 
least where their effects on the cycle are concerned.
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the authors’ logic, the liquidation of Lehman Brothers 
was the right step to take.19 Following this approach, 
the aim should not be for risk-taking to be reduced 
through regulation but for the market to penalize those 
who get it wrong. This would mean reducing the size 
of the safety net, whether explicit or implicit.
This discussion revolves around two concepts: 
systemic risk and moral hazard. Generally speaking, 
what generates systemic risk is the lack of  perfect 
information on the solvency and liquidity of financial 
institutions, although it can also arise when such 
perfect information is available, as it “may be rational 
behaviour to withdraw deposits from a solvent 
financial institution if  one thinks it may cease to be 
solvent as a result of  a run on its deposits by other 
depositors. In this case there are rational expectations 
that are conditional on the behaviour of other agents, 
whose level of  information is unknown” (Machinea, 
2002, p. 14).
History shows us that, following the 1930 crisis, it 
is hard to find situations of acute financial crisis that 
have not led to significant intervention by the economic 
authorities.20 In other words, priority has been given 
to systemic risk over moral hazard (Goodhart, 1999). 
The reason is obvious: a systemic crisis can generate 
high costs in terms of  lower output and higher 
unemployment, while the costs associated with moral 
hazard do not look so considerable, or at least seem 
to be remote in time. Furthermore, two strategies have 
generally been used to reduce the moral hazard of 
public intervention: (i) “constructive discretion” and 
(ii) the policy of not bailing out bank shareholders. 
The former means that the central bank is not explicit 
about the policy it intends to follow towards financial 
institutions in difficulties.
However, the problem with the strategy of reducing 
moral hazard by punishing shareholders is that the 
management of a number of major financial institutions 
tends to be quite independent. In particular, executives 
who receive extraordinary bonuses linked to short-term 
profits are usually unaffected by any action aimed at 
punishing shareholders.
In summary, if the two principles set out above are 
adhered to, it seems unlikely that bankers and investors 
will take on so many risks when the probability of a 
bailout is substantially less than 1 and profits have to be 
weighed against a prospective loss of 100% of capital.
It has been argued in this connection that if  
systemic risk is the result of information asymmetry, the 
best way to resolve it is through greater transparency, 
so that runs on particular financial institutions are 
the result of the purging effects of the market rather 
than confusion among savers about their solvency.21 
Considering the costs of obtaining and interpreting 
individual information, the solution would be for advice 
to be provided by specialists who would benefit from 
clear economies of scale. This is the role that ought 
to be played, for example, by the rating agencies. The 
role they actually have played in several of the most 
recent crises, but particularly the present one, obviates 
the need for any further discussion of the subject.
It may be mentioned here that a number of the 
region’s countries substantially reduced their safety 
nets in the 1990s, while the flow of information in the 
market increased. Safety nets continued to be removed 
for as long as it took the crisis to appear.22
21 See Calomiris and Gorton (1990) and Calomiris and Powell 
(2000).
22 See Machinea (1996) and Rozenwurcel and Bleger (1997) for a 
critical review of these reforms in Argentina.
19 A similar argument is made by Bordo (2008). However, it is 
difficult to understand how moral hazard could have been an issue 
in the case of shareholders, whose shares lost just over 90% of their 
value compared to a year earlier.
20 By “significant interventions” are meant those that exceed the 
deposit guarantee designed to protect uninformed small depositors. 
At present, runs on financial institutions are usually led by large 
depositors.
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In early September 2008 there was a major credit 
crunch and interbank credits were difficult to obtain, 
even though the premium over United States Treasury 
bills in the commercial paper and interbank markets 
was below the average of the previous 12 months (see 
figure 2). The disappearance of Bear Stearns via its 
takeover by J.P. Morgan had confirmed the perception 
that some financial institutions were too big to fail, 
including the investment banks. Creditors got their 
money back and the only ones to be penalized were 
shareholders, who recovered less than 10% of what their 
shares had been worth a year earlier. Thus, a worsening 
of systemic risk was avoided without creating moral 
hazard for shareholders.
The situation changed radically on 15 September 
following the liquidation of Lehman Brothers; losses 
for the financial system as a whole as a result of that 
event are put at US$ 500 billion. The reading of the 
markets was that any intermediary could be liquidated, 
regardless of size, with all the effects on the system 
this implied. At this signal, panic spread and the 
credit markets seized up. In the interbank market, the 
interest rate rose by 175 points over Treasury bill yields 
in 10 days and 350 in a month (see figure 2); much 
the same happened in the commercial paper market. 
Everything suggests that the financial markets were 
just hours away from a complete meltdown.
The lesson, which is not a new one, is that 
disciplining the market in the middle of a crisis is not 
so much mistaken as outright foolish. The Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy may have brought some order 
to other actors, as is shown by the fact that the sales 
operation of Merrill Lynch was shut down the same 
day, but in the days that followed it became clear that 
while the medicine had been effective in disciplining 
some investment banks, it had exacted an extraordinarily 
high cost for the stability of the system. If there was any 
doubt as to which needed to be given priority in a crisis, 
systemic risk or moral hazard, the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy will probably go down in history as the 
episode that ended the debate… at least for a while.
The problem of moral hazard is still there, of 
course, but it cannot be eliminated at the cost of 
imperilling the world economy. While it may be argued 
that the collapse was due to underlying structural 
causes that went beyond Lehman Brothers, there can 
be no doubt that its liquidation made the crisis more 
likely to worsen.
IV
How the crisis spread:
prioritizing moral hazard
V
From bailing out financial institutions
to bailing out the economy
The search for an answer to the question of what is 
needed to end the crisis has occupied many economists 
and politicians over recent months, and this search 
has yielded different proposals. Leaving aside the 
need to rethink the way the international financial 
system operates, however, the answers have been 
converging upon two elements on which action ought, 
in our view, to be taken in the short term: restoring 
a “certain level” of lending and using fiscal policy to 
boost demand.
1. Credit and the financial system
To restore a certain level of lending, one necessary 
step is to reduce the uncertainty surrounding financial 
institutions. Accordingly, the measures taken since 
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mid-September have aimed to restore the liquidity 
and solvency of these institutions. This has required 
huge public-sector intervention involving sums so 
large that they would have been unimaginable just 
months before.
Specifically, to improve liquidity the public sector 
decided, with some variations between countries, to 
guarantee the liabilities of financial institutions by 
raising deposit guarantee limits (or removing them 
in extreme cases) and guaranteeing interbank credits 
and placements on the capital markets. Thanks to these 
measures, the costs of financial institutions’ liabilities 
fell and much of their liquidity was restored.
However, the increase in liquidity has not translated 
into a rise in lending to the private sector, for three 
reasons. Firstly, financial institutions still feel a degree 
of uncertainty about renewing their liabilities, even 
though the situation is starting to normalize. This is 
forcing them to maintain a higher level of liquidity 
than usual, something that has been manifested in the 
increase in bank reserves already referred to. This is a 
variant on the liquidity trap, as it prevents monetary 
policy from being effective in reducing interest rates 
on loans to the private sector.23
The second reason is the loss of bank capital 
and thus the need to re-establish the ratio between 
capital and assets. The third is uncertainty about the 
solvency of potential customers in the context of a 
deepening recession.
To resolve or at least palliate the problem of 
solvency among financial institutions, public-sector 
measures were initially aimed at purchasing toxic assets 
and, increasingly, at using State funds to capitalize 
these institutions. The problem with this measure is 
the difficulty of estimating portfolio quality in the 
midst of  a recession, and thus of  calculating how 
much fresh capital is needed. Given the news items 
appearing daily in the media about different banks 
requiring further capital injections after already 
receiving assistance, the time has come to take some 
final decision that can significantly reduce uncertainty. 
One alternative, which worked in the Nordic countries 
in the early 1990s, is temporary nationalization of 
banks. The second would be for the public sector to 
buy toxic assets from financial institutions and set 
up a “bad bank”, but the difficulty here would be 
in setting the price: paying the market price would 
not solve the problem, but paying nominal values 
would be tantamount to making a gift of taxpayers’ 
money to the banks.24 A halfway solution would be 
to acquire assets at an above-market price but with 
the stipulation that the bank thus benefited is obliged 
to repay out of future profits the difference between 
that value and the amount ultimately recovered.25 In 
this case and for the duration of the emergency, the 
debt would have to be excluded from calculations of 
the institution’s net worth given that it would be set 
against profits.26 Another alternative is to create a 
new “good bank” from the sound assets of existing 
banks. Creditors (other than guaranteed deposit-
holders) and shareholders in the rump banks would 
only get back whatever they could recover from the 
“bad” assets plus the difference (if  positive) between 
the “good” assets and the guaranteed deposits 
transferred to the new bank (Buiter, 2009). Although 
this option entails the smallest fiscal cost in the short 
run, it is also the one that would generate the greatest 
uncertainty because of the large losses that would 
affect unsecured creditors. However, if  a decision is 
not taken soon, rising losses will mean that the final 
option is the only viable one.
Partly because of undercapitalization, but also due 
to the other two factors mentioned earlier, particularly 
the uncertainty associated with the recession, the 
Federal Reserve took a step that would have been 
unthinkable a few months ago, although it is not 
without precedent in financial history: it decided 
to lend directly to the private sector by purchasing 
commercial paper.27 In early 2009, for its part, the 
Bank of England announced that it would guarantee 
some lending to small and medium-sized enterprises. 
24 This alternative is akin to guaranteeing part of banks’ existing 
assets.
25 The bank itself  could be given the portfolio to administer. The 
incentive is obvious: the more it recovers, the less it will have to 
pay back.
26 This obviously cannot become normal practice, but it could be 
applied for the duration of the emergency.
27 Although it is unusual, history does record similar episodes. For 
example, Bagehot quotes the words of a Bank of England director 
in the 1825 crisis: “`We lent it on behalf of the Bank of England by 
every possible means and in modes we had never adopted before; we 
took in stock on security, we purchased Exchequer bills, we made 
advances on Exchequer bills, we not only discounted outright, but 
we made advances on the deposit of bills of exchange to an immense 
amount, in short, by every possible means consistent with the safety 
of the Bank…” (Bagehot, 1920, p. 52). In 1970, furthermore, after 
the collapse of the Penn Central railway company, the Federal 
Reserve provided credits to non-financial firms, taking commercial 
paper as security.
23 See Krugman (2008) for an ingenious demonstration of the 
importance of fiscal policies in this context.
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From being lenders of  last resort, in other words, 
central banks have become the only lenders.
Unfortunately, the current hyperactivity does not 
make up for the lack of earlier action to control the 
financial system and the property bubble. Beyond the 
extraordinary costs of the assistance package, financial 
measures are unlikely to re-establish growth. Their 
central aim is to prevent a depression occurring because 
of bank closures and the disappearance of credit. It is 
one thing to prevent credit from “disappearing”, but 
quite another to restore it to normal levels. Further 
pressure needs to be brought to bear on financial 
institutions assisted by the public sector so that they 
start lending again, and although there is scope for 
the State to guarantee some new credits, everything 
suggests that the process of restoring lending to normal 
levels will take a great deal of time. This is not only 
because of the supply factors referred to, but also 
because solvent potential borrowers will hardly be in 
a mood to take out loans for durable goods purchases 
or investment in this climate of uncertainty. This is a 
further obstacle for monetary policy, since the liquidity 
trap is being compounded by another of the factors 
emphasized by Keynes: the low interest-rate elasticity 
of spending in a climate of depression.28
2. The need for a fiscal stimulus
Based on the arguments in the previous paragraph, there 
is a need to increase the fiscal deficit as a mechanism for 
stimulating demand. This does not mean neglecting the 
important role of monetary policy, including further 
cuts in interest rates; otherwise credit and confidence 
would collapse and no fiscal measures would be 
sufficient to ward off  a major depression.
It should be said that before the present crisis 
there was a degree of consensus, at least in the United 
States, that the best way of conducting countercyclical 
policy was by means of automatic fiscal stabilizers and 
monetary policy.29 In other words, discretionary fiscal 
policy was ruled out on the basis of some historical 
evidence and of arguments that were central in the 
debate between monetarists and Keynesians in the 
1960s and 1970s, such as the time it took to put fiscal 
policies into effect once they became necessary given 
the process involved (diagnosis, preparation, support 
from Congress, tendering), the “crowding out” of the 
private sector as a consequence of higher interest rates, 
and the lower fiscal multiplier posited by theories of 
permanent or life cycle income.30
However, the scale and likely duration of  the 
current crisis and, particularly, the limited or negligible 
effectiveness of monetary policy in a situation like the 
present one have silenced a number of these objections 
(Taylor, 2008b; Blinder, 2008). Discussion seems to 
have centred now on the type of fiscal stimulus; the 
“monetarists” recommend tax cuts (designed to reach 
as many people as possible) or subsidies, both on a 
permanent basis (Taylor, 2008b). We believe that to 
settle on solutions of this type would be a mistake, 
because it is not the moment to adopt permanent 
measures that merit more thorough discussion and 
because resources need to be targeted, for reasons of 
equity and efficiency, on the sectors most affected by the 
crisis. We say “efficiency” and not just “equity” because 
these are the sectors for which liquidity constraints are 
critical to spending decisions. The developed countries 
have established a system that acts as an automatic 
stabilizer: unemployment insurance. The idea is to 
increase, exceptionally, the amount of the subsidy or 
the time it is paid so that it becomes something more 
than an automatic stabilizer. Supplementary measures 
could include subsidizing the mortgage payments of 
certain borrowers (unemployed and lower-income) 
and financing local public works, which tend to be 
relatively small-scale and quick to execute. To these 
might be added fiscal measures to favour present 
consumption over future consumption. What needs 
to be clear is that in this case efficiency is to be gauged 
not by the “quality” of spending but by its effects on 
overall demand and the speed with which it can be 
implemented (imf, 2008a).
The measures referred to should not include tax 
cuts, since in an atmosphere of crisis and uncertainty 
a lower tax burden will probably not translate into 
substantially higher spending, particularly given the 
difficulty of targeting tax cuts on lower-income sectors 
or those most affected by the crisis. Unfortunately, 
30 See, for example, Feldstein (2002), Auerbach (2002), Taylor 
(2000 and 2008a) and Blinder (2004), although this last does say 
that fiscal policy would be necessary in “extreme situations”.
28 The fact that interest rates have less effect on demand does 
not mean that reducing them does not cause disposable income 
to rise. The most obvious case is the relationship between 
European Central Bank rates and euribor, the rate to which 
most mortgages are indexed.
29 The United States was one of the few countries where monetary 
policy played this role on different occasions; elsewhere, an 
“extreme” version of  inflation targeting sometimes prevented 
monetary policy from playing a countercyclical role.
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political negotiations are increasingly tending in this 
direction. It would be a grave mistake to increase debt 
in these circumstances without being sure what the 
effect on demand will be.
In summary, what is needed is a large-scale fiscal 
incentive that has substantial repercussions on demand 
and can be brought in as quickly as possible. Although 
it may sometimes seem doubtful that any fiscal stimulus 
can offset the sharp fall in private-sector investment and 
consumption, the idea is not to reverse the short-term 
trend but to find a floor for the recession that might 
help to change expectations.
To increase overall demand significantly, there 
needs to be a coordinated effort involving both 
developed and developing countries. It is worth 
remembering here that developing countries were 
key actors in the recovery from the 2001 recession, as 
they have accounted for over 60% of global growth 
in recent years. China and India have obviously been 
the main actors in this new situation. With a few 
exceptions, however, developing countries have far 
less scope to implement countercyclical policies than 
developed ones.
Two concluding remarks are called for. First, the 
prospects of success will be lessened if  some of the 
major developed and developing countries do not 
cooperate, and there will also be a problem of inequity: 
in a globalized world of more open economies, those 
that do not participate will benefit from the efforts 
of those that do. Second, it is important not just to 
increase spending, but to ensure that fiscal policy does 
not include more or less covert “national procurement” 
clauses. While these do make fiscal packages easier to 
pass, there are two problems with them. The first is 
the risk of triggering protectionist policies; the world 
experienced the consequences of these once before 
in the 1930s, but they would be far greater today. 
The second is that developing countries would be 
the worst affected, both by protectionism and by the 
fact that countercyclical policies, as analysed in the 
next section, will be applied on a greater scale in the 
developed countries.
31 Considering that there is an article in this edition of  cepal 
Review specifically discussing the impact of  the crisis on Latin 
America, here we shall offer a stylized account of  certain 
developments.
VI
Developing countries: the needs
and limitations of Latin America
1. Overview of the situation
As must inevitably be the case in a globalized world, 
developing countries have begun to experience the 
effects of the financial crisis. In Latin America these 
effects have been felt through two channels: a real 
channel and a financial one.31
Through the “real” channel, Mexico and the 
Central American countries are being affected by the 
drop in industrial exports and remittances and by the 
fall-off in tourism and foreign direct investment (fdi). 
Lower commodity prices are having a major impact 
in South America and, to a lesser extent, Mexico; 
lower oil prices will favour Central America, however 
(eclac, 2008a and 2008b).
Table 2 summarizes a number of  the effects 
of the crisis on the current accounts of the region’s 
countries. The table was prepared using 2008 current 
accounts, with the adjustments consequent upon the 
international financial crisis (“exogenous factors”). In 
other words, it does not take into account the internal 
adjustments (exchange rates and level of activity) that 
would be necessary if  higher current-account deficits 
could not be financed. It is assumed that total imports 
remain unchanged, which is compatible with a growth 
rate of 3% if investment declines substantially because 
of negative expectations and the lack of financing.32 
Exogenous variations reflect changes expected in: 
(i) export and import prices, (ii) industrial export 
volumes, (iii) remittances, (iv) tourism revenues and 
32 If  capital goods imports (which represent about 25% of  all 
imports) declined by 15%, this would leave room for imports 
of  other products to increase by 5%, which is compatible with 
3% growth.
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(v) in some countries, a drop in rents from natural 
resource exploitation being sent abroad. All these 
variables are calculated for two alternative scenarios, 
presented in the annex. The results show the scale 
of the problem: in the least pessimistic scenario, the 
current-account deficit increases by an average of 3.3 
points of national output to 4%, exceeding the 1997-
1998 figure (see table 2). In the rather more pessimistic 
scenario it reaches 5.1% of gdp. To complicate the 
situation, foreign direct investment is expected to fall 
sharply, reducing one of the least unstable sources of 
financing for the current account. On the less pessimistic 
hypothesis (25% drop), net fdi would be equivalent to 
1.6% of output in the region as a whole. This implies a 
financing shortfall of US$ 91 billion (US$ 138 billion 
in the more pessimistic scenario), 68% of it in two 
countries, Brazil and Mexico (see table 2).
To this must be added the maturity of external 
debts, which different estimates put at US$ 120 
billion, giving a total of US$ 210 billion. Financing 
this imbalance will not be easy, as the repercussions 
of the crisis are being manifested via the “financial” 
channel in higher country risk (see figure 8). In fact, 
a number of countries (Argentina, Ecuador and the 
Bolivarian Republic of  Venezuela) have no access 
to international credit. Furthermore, private-sector 
debt is going to be difficult to roll over, as this would 
require a normalization of the financial market in 
relation to the fourth quarter of 2008, when outflows 
of private capital led to sharp devaluations. These 
have affected the liability situation of private-sector 
firms, although the most significant effect has been 
the “disappearance” of credit, which has left many 
of them on the verge of default and operating with 
very short-term credits.33 34
Depending on the characteristics of each country 
and the economic policy measures adopted, the lack 
of new international financing will affect international 
reserves, the real exchange rate and the level of economic 
TABLE 2
Latin America: current-account balance and financing requirements
 Percentages of  gdp Millions of  dollars
 2008 2009 2009 Average 2009 2009
  scenario 1a scenario 2a 1997-1998 scenario 1: adjusted scenario 1: financing
     current-account balance needs net of  fdi
Argentina 3.7 -1.4 -2.4 -4.5 -4 027  -352
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 14.8 6.8 5.6 -7.4 942  0
Brazil -2.0 -3.4 -3.7 -3.7 -45 450  -30 450
Chile -3.3 -9.7 -9.6 -4.7 -16 507  -8 130
Colombia -3.0 -4.6 -5.8 -4.6 -9 794  -3 311
Costa Rica -9.0 -9.6 -10.9 -3.7 -2 606  -1 205
Dominican Rep. -13.6 -14.4 -15.4 -1.3 -6 191  -4 316
Ecuador 3.2 -7.3 -10.8 -5.4 -3 558  -3 033
El Salvador -6.4 -7.8 -9.4 -0.8 -1 636  -1 308
Guatemala -5.3 -7.1 -8.3 -5.0 -2 449  -1 872
Haiti -2.7 -3.9 -5.3 -1.2 -245  -222
Honduras -13.2 -14.7 -15.2 -3.5 -1 878  -1 204
Mexico -1.5 -4.0 -5.2 -2.9 -41252  -31 433
Nicaragua -29.7 -28.5 -28.3 -22.0 -1 684  -1 384
Panama -10.0 -9.2 -10.5 -7.2 -1 949  -599
Paraguay -2.6 -14.7 -14.5 -4.8 -1 882  -1 725
Peru -4.8 -8.6 -9.1 -5.8 -10 108  -5 233
Uruguay -4.3 -4.0 -4.3 -1.7 -1 026  0
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 16.6 1.3 -3.2 -0.4 3 213  0
Latin America -0.7 -4.0 -5.1 -3.7 -148 087  -91 306
Source: prepared by the author (see annex).
a Current-account balances in 2009 are expressed in terms of 2008 gdp. See annex for the assumptions involved in the two scenarios.
33 The situation is even more critical in a number of eastern European 
and Asian countries, particularly the Russian Federation. See J.P. 
Morgan (2008).
34 A number of corporations, particularly in Brazil and Mexico, 
had made bets in the derivatives market against a devaluation of 
the local currency. This led a number of them into substantial 
losses and even bankruptcy.
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activity. In other words, the lack of  financing can 
be offset, at least in part and for a limited time, by 
running down international reserves. If  this proves 
insufficient, the other two instruments for adjusting 
the external imbalance will be devaluation of the real 
exchange rate and a lower rate of economic activity. 
In the fourth quarter of  2008, a combination of 
simultaneous changes in these three variables could 
be observed.
Although no exercise has been carried out to show 
the effects of the crisis on the public accounts, the 
close relationship between export commodity prices 
and fiscal revenues means that the latter are expected 
to fall substantially (Jiménez and Tromben, 2006). 
By way of compensation, sizeable energy subsides, 
which in 2008 stood at over one point of output in 
several countries, will be reduced. According to the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (eclac, 2008b), fiscal deficits will increase 
by about 1.5% of output in 2009. While this estimate 
may be on the optimistic side, the difference between 
this and other crises in terms of fiscal solvency is, 
thankfully, staggering.
To cope with the crisis, then, it will be necessary to 
implement countercyclical policies designed to offset the 
drop in demand (both external and internal) and finance 
the external and fiscal imbalances. Unsurprisingly, the 
two issues are clearly intertwined.
2. Countercyclical policies
Given the current global economic situation, we need 
to ask what developing countries, and Latin America 
in particular, can do to implement countercyclical 
policies. The short answer is: considerably less than 
the developed world.35
FIGURE 8
embi+ and 10-year United States Treasury bond yields, 2007-2008
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  Federal Reserve data and J.P. Morgan.
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10-year Treasury bond yields (right axis, percentages)
35 There are exceptions: the most striking is China, whose 
extraordinary level of savings and international reserves is allowing 
it to implement expansionary policies.
52
ThE InTERnATIonAL fInAnCIAL CRIsIs: ITs nATuRE And ThE EConomIC PoLICy ChALLEngEs  •  José LuIs mAChInEA
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 7  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 9
First of all, the channels through which assistance 
to the sectors worst affected by the crisis might 
be increased are not obvious, partly because most 
developing countries do not have unemployment 
insurance, or at least none that works effectively and has 
adequate coverage. Beyond channelling more resources 
into anti-poverty programmes and implementing public 
works in local areas, therefore, there is an urgent need to 
find other ways of reaching the middle-income sectors 
being affected by the crisis (such as funding existing 
health-care coverage for a certain period of time and 
paying a larger allowance per child).
Secondly, and most importantly, at times of crisis 
there is a clear macroeconomic asymmetry between 
developed and developing countries. This is manifested 
in the behaviour of interest rates, as investors seek 
refuge in the assets of developed countries and “flee” 
the currencies of developing countries. The consequence 
is that whereas interest rates fall in the former, they 
rise in the developing world. The current crisis offers 
the most extreme example of this. Whereas the average 
country risk of emerging countries increased by some 
445 basis points between early June and late December 
2008, yields on United States Treasury bills fell by 
145 basis points over the same period (see figure 8). 
Similarly, while the currencies of developing countries 
are depreciating, those of developed countries are 
tending to appreciate.
The effects of  these developments are fairly 
obvious. Capital flight, arising in consequence of 
greater uncertainty, makes it harder to implement 
countercyclical monetary policies. This does not 
mean there is no scope for reducing interest rates, 
given the easing of  inflationary pressures and the 
often excessive increases in these rates during the 
first nine months of 2008. Meanwhile, the increase 
in borrowing costs, or the virtual “disappearance” 
of credit in certain circumstances, is making it far 
more difficult to apply countercyclical fiscal policies. 
The situation is quite heterogeneous, however, partly 
because of policies from the recent past that are unlikely 
to change under current circumstances.36 At one 
extreme is Chile, which is in a position to implement 
countercyclical fiscal policies thanks to the resources 
it saved during the period of strong fiscal surpluses, 
although the country’s current-account deficit ought 
to be a cause for concern. At the other are Argentina, 
Ecuador and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
with a country risk spread of over 1,500 points, which 
is tantamount to not having access to credit. While 
other countries are in a position to borrow, they will 
be doing so at considerably higher rates than in recent 
years.37 Opportunities to implement countercyclical 
fiscal policies will thus be compromised, although the 
situation will vary from country to country.38
3. Financing from lending organizations
The absence of an international lender of last resort is 
more serious than ever in the circumstances described. 
This being so, the announcement by the Federal 
Reserve of a liquidity swap line for Brazil and Mexico 
is a step in the right direction; the real problems will 
come, however, for countries whose macroeconomic 
behaviour has been responsible but which will not 
qualify for special financing because they are not 
“strategic” for the United States. This is why there 
is a need for a lender of last resort that can generate 
incentives to reduce major imbalances and protect 
the level of economic activity. This will surely be a 
renewed imf, which will disburse significant amounts 
of resources promptly and, in the event of sudden 
changes in the capital markets, unconditionally, at 
least in the case of countries that can demonstrate 
responsible macroeconomic behaviour.39 Failure to do 
so promptly would mean that resources which ought 
to be helping to stem the run on the currency market, 
preventing sharp devaluations and underpinning 
demand, i.e., serving as a countercyclical mechanism, 
could instead end up financing capital flight.
Multilateral support needs to be supplemented by 
the regional networks that are playing an increasingly 
important role throughout the world.40 They are 
complementary because, while regional networks are 
much more efficient at providing assistance as and when 
needed, at least in Latin America, they are unlikely to 
have the resources they need to finance larger countries 
at a time of major upheaval.41
37 Brazil and Mexico will also be in a position to take up the US$ 30 
billion liquidity swap facility announced by the Federal Reserve.
38 A number of countries have already announced countercyclical 
measures, however. See eclac (2009) for a good summary. Their 
ability to implement what has been announced will be put to the 
test over the coming months.
39 Concessional interest rates would be required for middle- to low-
income countries. See Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (2008).
40 See Ocampo (2006).
41 Machinea and Titelman (2007) discuss ways of boosting regional 
institutions in Latin America.36 See Gerchunoff (2008).
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Notwithstanding the differences between 
developing countries in their capacity to implement 
countercyclical policies, there is something they 
all have in common with one another and with 
“recently developed” countries such as the Republic 
of Korea: since the Asian crisis, these countries have 
followed a policy of self-insurance involving larger 
international reserves and the creation of sovereign 
funds. In line with this, a number of these countries 
have been running current-account surpluses, which 
has contributed to the global supply of “lendable” 
funds. If  what is needed now is higher demand to 
support economic recovery, it is reasonable to think 
that these countries’ current accounts will weaken, a 
process that will be accelerated in some of them due 
to falling prices for their export products. Thus, not 
only for structural reasons but also to meet immediate 
needs, the incentive for self-insurance deriving from 
the defective workings of the international financial 
system needs to be removed.42
Lastly, returning to the financial needs of 2009 
and doubtless 2010 as well, the lack of international 
financing may condemn the region and particularly its 
smaller countries to a disproportionate adjustment. 
Assuming that private lending normalizes to some 
degree, there is an urgent need for net financing of at 
least US$ 70 billion a year (or about US$ 90 billion 
gross) from lending organizations or developed 
countries.43 The harder credit is to come by, the larger 
this figure will obviously be.
VII
Final reflections
In the years leading up to the crisis that began in 2007 
and worsened in 2008, the world economy grew at a 
rapid rate. It was a period when the financial sector 
grew on the back of globalization and innovations 
that helped to expand capital markets, accelerate the 
creation of new intermediaries and instruments and, 
crucially, reduce relative capital levels in the finance 
industry as a whole. It was also a time when the profits 
of financial intermediaries grew exponentially, swelling 
from 5% of all profits of firms listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange in 1980 to 40% in 2007.
This “explosion” in the finance business favoured 
the growth of certain sectors, particularly durable goods 
purchases and construction, but it did so —particularly 
in the last 10 years— at the cost of growing structural 
weakness. This is not a new phenomenon, as it has 
happened on many occasions over the last two centuries 
and especially the last 40 years. In this document we 
have discussed the main factors behind the crisis, 
stressing the instability inherent in the financial system, 
which has intensified in recent years owing to policies 
of excessive deregulation. We have also argued that 
the right instrument for correcting the exuberance of 
the system and its effects on asset markets is not the 
interest rate, but financial regulations.
We have also considered what might be done 
to reduce the scale of  the recession and ward off  
the combination of  depression and deflation that 
is threatening the global economy. Developed 
countries have a particular responsibility here, not 
only because they caused the crisis, but also because 
the problem banks are located within their territories 
and because they have greater scope for implementing 
countercyclical policies. As well as speeding up 
implementation of  these measures, there is a need 
to act as decisively as possible both in applying the 
fiscal stimulus package and in recapitalizing banks. 
Delays and “shortfalls” may mean years of recession, 
compounding future public-sector debt problems. In 
other words, it would be better to borrow somewhat 
more now to prevent a prolonged recession that would 
perpetuate the rising trend in the public debt, as has 
happened in Japan in recent years.
Where banks are concerned, the options are 
narrowing in some countries. Unless a permanent 
solution is found involving temporary nationalization 
or the purchase of “bad assets”, with all the problems 
this entails, the option of creating new institutions on the 
basis of existing banks’ “good assets” and guaranteed 
deposits is the one that will begin to prevail, with “toxic 
assets” and unguaranteed liabilities remaining behind 
42 This mechanism will obviously not alter the incentive for China 
and the Russian Federation to build up international reserves, as 
these countries’ strategy is guided by other considerations.
43 The Institute of International Finance expects these organizations 
to disburse no more than a net US$ 8 billion in Latin America 
in 2009.
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in the old banks. While the latter alternative has a lower 
fiscal cost, it would increase the level of uncertainty 
about banks (or countries) that had not opted for one 
of the other solutions, so that its overall effects would 
be difficult to predict.
A few comments apart, this document has not 
examined the changes needed on the international stage 
and in national financial systems. With regard to these 
challenges: aside from altering the incentive system for 
bank executives, reorganizing the way rating agencies 
operate to ensure they are truly independent, preventing 
liabilities other than deposits from exceeding a set 
amount and increasing the transparency of traded assets, 
there is a vital need to create countercyclical financial 
regulation, i.e., to increase capital requirements during 
upturns and reduce them in recessions. Furthermore, 
given the enormous capacity of the financial sector for 
innovation, there is a need to supplement particular 
capital requirements by risk type with a blanket limit 
covering all the different varieties of assets.44 In any 
event, whatever regulations are put forward in the 
international sphere will require more input from 
developing countries, since they cannot be identical 
for countries with different levels of macro volatility 
and financial depth and instability.45
The economics of countercyclical measures is 
not simple, since nobody likes to “stop the party”, 
especially considering that almost all sectors benefit 
during booms. As the effects of the current crisis are 
showing, however, when the party does stop, i.e., 
when boom turns to bust, the costs are not shared in 
the same way as they were during the years of strong 
growth. Lower growth, unemployment and higher 
taxes particularly affect middle-income and poorer 
sections of the population. In the face of all these 
pressures, it is important to construct institutions 
that can help to implement countercyclical financial 
policies during booms. Difficult as it may be, now is 
the time to do it.
The other aspect to stress, once again, is the need to 
have global and regional safety nets so that developing 
countries have better prospects of  implementing 
countercyclical policies. This will mean restructuring 
everything about the imf  from its governance (with a 
greater presence for developing countries on the board) 
to credit access (which needs to become more flexible, 
particularly at times like the present).
The existence of global safety nets would also spare 
countries the need to self-insure by increasing their 
international reserves, which limits their willingness 
to run moderate current-account deficits. Thus, global 
and regional safety nets will not only make it easier 
for developing countries to moderate the adjustments 
required in times of difficulty, but will also help to 
forestall the kinds of structural imbalances seen in 
recent years.
Lastly, given that proper regulation of the financial 
system involves reducing its procyclical tendencies 
and generally increasing risk capital requirements, 
it is possible that credit growth may be less in the 
short term, a small price to pay when set against 
a less procyclical and more stable financial system 
and thus stronger credit growth in the medium and 
long run. Future changes in financial regulation will 
have to reckon with pressure groups that will soon be 
inclined to downplay the effects of the crisis or put the 
blame on other actors. It is also important that these 
regulations should not hinder financial innovation 
and, in particular, that efforts to reduce risk do not 
obstruct the financing of developing countries.
44 A proposal that meets both requirements is that of Goodhart 
and Persaud (2008).
45 See Fanelli (2008).
annEx
Assumptions used to construct the scenarios
The effects of the global economic recession on the current 
accounts of the Latin American countries were estimated 
following the assumptions detailed below, which in a number 
of cases were constructed using information from the fourth 
quarter of 2008. For example, remittances fell by about 5% 
in the fourth quarter of 2008, prior to the large increase in 
unemployment in the United States, so that two alternatives 
were analysed: an 8% and a 15% drop. Where the terms of 
trade were concerned, eclac assumptions for 2009 were used. 
For manufacturing exports, the percentage of manufacturing 
exports under the maquila system was taken, and only value 
added was imputed to them. In all cases other than the terms 
of trade, it was assumed that the percentage change relative 
to 2008 would be the same in all the countries.
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1. Terms of trade:
 Alternative 1: reduction of  12.8% (with a 40% drop 
in the oil price).
 Alternative 2: reduction of  14.2% (50% drop in the 
oil price).
2. Manufacturing exports:
 Alternative 1: reduction of  5% by volume.
 Alternative 2: reduction of  10% by volume.
3. Tourism:
 Alternative 1: 10% decline in net revenues.
 Alternative 2: 20% decline.
4. Remittances:
 Alternative 1: 8% reduction.
 Alternative 2: 15% reduction.
5. Investment revenues:
 Considering the drop in returns on mining 
operations, rents sent abroad were reduced to their 
level of 2005, a year when export prices for minerals 
were similar to those forecast for 2009. The exercise 
was carried out for three countries where this item 
had seen an extraordinary increase in recent years. 
The reduction implies a fall of  about US$ 10 
billion, US$ 4 billion and US$ 3 billion in Chile, 
Colombia and Peru, respectively.
Regarding financing, the assumptions made for net 
foreign direct investment were:
a. Alternative 1: 25% decline from 2008.
b. Alternative 2: 35% decline.
(Original: Spanish)
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